PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF SEAD DSDV

Abstract

Ad hoc networks are a new wireless networking paradigm for mobile hosts. Unlike traditional mobile wireless networks, ad hoc networks do not rely on any fixed infrastructure. Instead, hosts rely on each other to keep the network connected. Although there is a trend to adapt ad. hoc networks for commercial use the military tactical and other security sensitive operations are still the main applications of ad hoc networks, due to their unique properties. One main challenge in design of these networks is their vulnerability to security attacks. Many routing protocols (e.g., AODV, DSDV, DSR, etc) have been proposed for MANETs. However., most assume that nodes are trustworthy and cooperative. Thus, they are vulnerable to a variety of attacks. Some of the secure protocols proposed are SEAD, ARAN, SRP, ARIADNE. SEAD is based on DSDV. SEAD can detect larger sequence number fraud and shorter distance fraud but it is vulnerable to smaller sequence number fraud. We propose a secure routing protocol also based on DSDV, in which, a well-behaved node can successfully detect a malicious routing update with any sequence number fraud (larger or smaller) and shorter distance fraud provided no two nodes are in collusion. Our protocol is based on one-way hash chains. We compare security properties and efficiency of proposed protocol with SEAD and DSDV-SQ. The analysis shows that proposed method has more network overhead than SEAD. We believe that the proposed protocol's overhead is justified by the enhanced security and reduced verification overhead. In the proposed protocol tree-authenticated one-way chains mechanism is used, by which, the verification cost is bounded to 0 (k + logs), where k is maximum metric and s is the number of sequence numbers represented by the hash tree, . and which also prevents the sequence number rushing attack and shorter sequence number fraud.