RATIONALITY, IM/POLITENESS AND CONVERSATION: A PRAGMA- SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF DISCOURSE

Abstract

At present, in the field of linguistics, three purportedly universal theories of politeness are Lakoff (1973, 1975), Brown & Levinson (1978, 1987), and Leech (1983). Western scholars developed these theories, and much of the work on politeness, though certainly not all, has focused on Western languages. This study will explore the applicability and relevance of the three theoretical linguistics models: Brown and Levenson's Politeness Model (1978, 1987), Culpeper's Model of Impoliteness (1969), and the Gricean Cooperative Principle (hereafter CP) and Maxims (1975) in terms of discourse and conversation. This study commences with a comprehensive review of significant works on politeness models, the impoliteness model, and the Gricean CP and maxims, followed by a critical assessment in the context of previous critiques of these models. Throughout this examination, the researcher's argument will be in favour of establishing a significant connection among these three models and a vigorous claim to adjoin these three models together. Politeness is not solely a linguistic phenomenon but is embedded in the broader behavioural aspects of human interaction, communication, and discourse. Additionally, this study provides a robust theoretical and pragmatic foundation for studying linguistic im/politeness.Rationality, as defined by Brown & Levinson (hereafter B&L), is proposed to be "the sole acceptable explanatory framework" for explaining the notable similarities found in various cultures. The term 'rationality' holds significance in modernist thought. In their 1987 work, B&L aim "to identify fundamental principles of a universal yet 'social' nature, thereby presenting a plausible societal factor that influences the underlying grammatical patterns of languages in general." However, it is worth noting that Grice himself added a crucial perspective: "An unexciting yet reasonably satisfactory explanation is that a behaviour is simply a well-established empirical observation; individuals acquire these patterns of behaviour during childhood and continue to exhibit them" (Grice, 1975, p.48). In this context, it can delineate 'rationality' as the utilisation of a particular form of reasoning, referred to by Aristotle (1969) as cited in B&L (1978) as 'practical reasoning.' This type of reasoning ensures that inferences can be made from goals or objectives to the means that will effectively achieve the objectives. As classical logic possesses a relationship of consequence that allows us to move from one proposition to another while maintaining truth, a framework of practical reasoning should enable individuals to progress from ends to means and, subsequently, from means to further means, all while preserving the notion of 'adequacy' or 'satisfactoriness' of those means Kenny (1966) as cited in B&L (1978). Kenny proposes that a means to achieve a certain goal should be deemed satisfactory only if, when the proposition narrating the means is true, the proposition describing the end is also true. As it turns out, by adopting this understanding of practical reasoning's consequences, it becomes possible to create a formally decidable system with a well-defined semantic interpretation. Another aspect of rational behaviour involves the capacity to evaluate various means to an end and select the one that best aligns with the desired objectives. It indulgences all preferences as rational, and disregarding externally influenced desires can be considered a feasible approach for our purposes. However, a formal system encompasses a significant portion of what we intuitively define as rationality, encompassing concepts such as optimisation and cost assessment in selecting a means to an end.